The Role of Language for a Conceptual Being
Concepts are formed by a process of abstracting out similar aspects among entities and then integrating these aspects into a new concept. In order to properly retain and be able to call up such concepts at a moments notice, a conceptual being assigns a certain symbol to them—this is the role of language. I can call up the word “table” and immediately grasp the concept that it is standing in for—without this word such a task is impossible, without the word “table” I would have to re-abstract the relevant aspects from a number of concrete tables to bring the concept into focus. This is because concretes are the only things that actually exist—concepts do not, and cannot exist unto themselves. I must distil concepts down into something that is perceptually graspable, such as a word, or symbol, or artwork, in order that I can objectify1 the concept.
The role of consciousness, even on the conceptual level, is to “look out”—consciousness is not an entity and cannot sustain itself within its own realm. Consciousness must always return to this primary task of perceiving that which exists, rather than turning in on itself in a jumbled mess of abstractions without any clear or perhaps even existing concrete referents.
It is not true that words are necessary primarily for the sake of communication. Words are essential to the process of conceptualization and thus to all thought. They are as necessary in the privacy of a man’s mind as in any public forum; they are as necessary on a desert island as in society. The word constitutes the completion of the integration stage; it is the form in which the concept exists. Using the soul-body terminology, we may say that the word is the body, and the conscious perspective involved, the soul—and that the two form a unity which cannot be sundered. A concept without a word is at best an ephemeral resolve; a word without a concept is noise. “Words transform concepts into (mental) entities,” writes Miss Ayn Rand; “definitions provide them with identity.”2